Offshoring, economic insecurity, and the demand for social insurance by Richard G. Anderson & Charles S. Gascon
      Research Division 
          Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 










Richard G. Anderson  
And 















FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS 
Research Division 
P.O. Box 442  
St. Louis, MO 63166 
 
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
The views expressed are those of the individual authors and do not necessarily reflect official positions of 
the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, the Federal Reserve System, or the Board of Governors. 
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Working Papers are preliminary materials circulated to stimulate 
discussion and critical comment. References in publications to Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Working 
Papers (other than an acknowledgment that the writer has had access to unpublished material) should be 








The fear of o⁄shoring, particularly in services since 2000, has raised workers
economic insecurity and heightened concerns over future economic global-
ization. Many have argued that globalization has exacerbated labor market
turbulence increasing the demand for social insurance programs. The au-
thors present a simple theoretical model establishing a connection between
the threat of o⁄shoring, economic insecurity, and the demand for social
insurance. Data from the 1972-2006 General Social Survey to provides
supporting empirical evidence.
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1 Introduction
Trends in workers￿perceived economic insecurity have moved closely with the
unemployment rate over the past three decades (see ￿gures 1 and 2 ). However,
since the mid 1990s the average level of economic insecurity has failed to trend
downward with the unemployment rate. This apparent rise in insecurity has
focused attention on future economic globalization. Rodrik (1997), Scheve and
Slaughter (2004), and Traca (2005), among others, ￿nd that higher levels of
economic insecurity result from greater wage and employment volatility, which
is a product of trade-induced increases in labor-demand elasticities. Moreover,
Rodrik (1998) claims there is a positive relationship between increased economic
integration and the size of the welfare state.
Rodrik (1998) argues that the government can play a risk-reducing role,
as workers exposed to higher levels of international trade are exposed to more
labor market risk. This ￿risk￿is essentially the higher volatility in wages and
employment from a more elastic demand for labor. Traca (2005) ￿nds evidence
1to support this hypothesis. Slaughter (2001), however, ￿nds ￿mixed [empirical]
support￿for the hypothesis that trade has contributed to increased labor de-
mand elasticities. Furthermore, Iversen and Cusack (2000) ￿nd that changing
welfare preferences can be explained by internal labor market transformations
and not globalization. Panagariya (1999) directly refutes Rodrik￿ s hypothesis.1
Cusack, Iversen, and Rehm (2006) (henceforth CIR) focus on how labor
market risk is related to preferences for redistribution. CIR use the popular
International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) and industry-level data to es-
tablish; which objective measures of insecurity (labor market indicators) deter-
mine preferences for redistribution; and whether objective measures are good
predictors of subjective economic insecurity.2 CIR ￿nd that in both cases labor
market indicators are statistically signi￿cant predictors of welfare policy prefer-
ences and perceived insecurity. The purpose of the second regression is, as CIR
note, because ￿it is not obvious that people have a good idea about their ac-
tual exposure to risk￿and, from a political economy standpoint, perceptions of
risk should be more important in determining policy preferences. If voters￿per-
ceptions are overly pessimistic about the condition of the economy, they could
demand government action, even if it is unnecessary.3
On the other hand, Mughan (2007) ￿nds that ￿no form of [subjective] job
insecurity has any impact on the support for enhanced social welfare provisions.￿
Mughan￿ s ￿ndings indicate it may not be safe to conclude that objective mea-
sures of insecurity are good estimates of perceived insecurity or that workers who
believe they are exposed to more risk demand more social insurance. Obviously
these con￿ icting results are data driven: CIR use 1970-2004 cross-national data,
while Mughan uses two separate surveys, a 1995 U.S. survey and 1998 Austrail-
ian survey. Fomenting the problem are signi￿cant di⁄erences in the questions
used to estimate welfare policy preferences, which we will discuss later. Mughan
concludes ￿despite these ￿ndings...the thesis [that insecurity determines wel-
fare preferences] should not be rejected.￿However, recent work by Campbell,
Carruth, Dickerson, and Green (2007) indicate that Mughan￿ s results may hold
water.4
In light of the literature reviewed above, we use data from the 1972-2006
General Social Survey (GSS) that corresponds nicely with the survey data used
by CIR and Mughan. With a few exceptions (Aaronson and Sullivan, 1998;
Schmidt, 1999), the GSS has not been fully utilized to study the issue of economic
insecurity. We ￿nd that increased international exposure (speci￿cally o⁄shoring)
has increased workers perceived economic insecurity. While this result is not
1To summarize, Panagariya (1999) uses two popular trade models (the 2x2 H-O model and
the speci￿c-factors model) to demonstrate that the labor-demand curve many not need to be
more elastic in an open economy than in a closed one.
2CIR note that the ISSP does not contain a sample of respondents who are asked about
both their own job security and about welfare policy preferences. Consequently, they run two
seperate regressions and di⁄erent samples of the data.
3One possible reason to expect this result is that the media tends to portray the economy
as being worse than the data indicate. For example see Blendon et al., (1997).
4Campbell et al. ￿nd that expectations data are additionally informative and contain useful
private information for predicting future unemployment. This suggests that using an objective
measure may produce misleading results.
2surprising, this paper is the ￿rst, to our knowledge to reach this conclusion using
U.S. data. Secondly, we ￿nd that workers who express higher levels of insecurity
tend to demand that the government should; play a larger role in redistributing
income from the rich to the poor; and spend more money on healthcare, welfare,
and social security programs. Conversely, we ￿nd no evidence that insecure
workers want the government to spend more money on education. The next
sections set forth a simple theoretical model connecting o⁄shoring, labor demand
elasticities and the demand for social insurance. Section 3 reviews the GSS data
and the construction of our variables. Section 4 outlines our empirical strategy
and results. The ￿nal section concludes and proposes some areas for future
research.
2 Theory
Economic insecurity is most often understood as an individual￿ s perception of
the risk of economic misfortune (e.g. Dominitz and Manski, 1997). Economic
misfortune can be thought of as individual￿ s inability to purchase goods and ser-
vices or provide for their families, actions that primarily depend on their income.
In reality, the majority of Americans do not earn their primary income from div-
idend payments or stock options, but rather from wages from labor income. We
make the standard assumption that economic insecurity primarily stems from
volatility in wages and employment, caused by volatility in the labor market.
As a result, the ￿rst part of this section uses labor theory in conjunction with
trade theory to review the argument that o⁄shoring a⁄ects economic insecurity
via increases in industries￿labor-demand elasticities.5 The result that follows￿
workers susceptible to o⁄shoring will express a higher probability of a job loss
than workers in safe industries￿ is used in an expected utility model, in which
workers￿demand for wage insurance is a function of their expected probability
of a costly job loss.
2.1 O⁄shoring and labor market volatility
The e⁄ect of increased globalization may be illustrated with a simple, perfect-
competition, industry-level labor demand model (e.g., Hamermesh, 1993). Let
an industry￿ s own-price labor demand elasticity, nd
j, consist of two parts, a scale
e⁄ect (snj) and a substitution e⁄ect (￿1[1 ￿ s]￿j):
nd
j = ￿1[1 ￿ s]￿j ￿ snj; (1)
where s is labor￿ s share of industry j￿ s total revenue; ￿j is the constant-output
elasticity of substitution between labor and all other factors of production; and
nj is the product-demand elasticity for industry j￿ s output market. nd
j is de￿ned
as negative; s, ￿j, and nj are positive. The scale e⁄ect measures the change
in the quantity of labor demanded after a wage change caused by a change
in output. The substitution e⁄ect tells us, for a given level of output, how
much ￿rms substitute away from labor and toward other factors of production
5The section 2.1 follows closely with the reasoning presented by Slaughter (2001).
3when wages rise. Both the scale and substitution e⁄ects reduce the quantity
of labor demanded when wages rise. For the purpose of this paper, we focus
on the processes in which o⁄shoring increases labor-demand elasticities via the
substitution e⁄ect.6
Suppose an industry is vertically integrated with a number of production
stages. Trade allows domestic ￿rms to lower production costs by o⁄shoring
work to foreign labor and importing intermediate inputs (e.g., Feenstra and
Hanson, 1996, 1999). Trade thus increases the number of factors that ￿rms
can substitute in response to higher domestic wages, beyond simply domestic
non-labor factors. Therefore, movement toward freer trade should increase the
elasticity of substitution, ￿j. Firms need not actually o⁄shore jobs to increase
￿j; the potential of o⁄shoring is su¢ cient (Slaughter, 2001). Di⁄erentiating (1)
with respect to ￿j shows that, as this substitutability increases, labor demand
becomes more elastic (i.e., nd




= ￿[1 ￿ s]: (2)
Additionally, as s decreases the pass-through from ￿j to nd
j strengthens. As a re-
sult, we would expect to see higher wages generate larger changes in the quantity
of labor demanded for industries with more capital intensive an production.7 It
can be easily shown8 that higher labor-demand elasticities increase the volatility
in wages and employment (e.g., Scheve and Slaughter, 2004). Increased economic
insecurity thus re￿ ects workers￿response to the greater volatility in employment
and wages within their industry (Rodrik, 1997).
2.2 Expected utility model
Assume a workers￿demand for social insurance is based on his desire to have
the same level of consumption even if an adverse event, such as a costly job loss,
befalls him. His expected utility is such that:
EUi = (1 ￿ pi) ￿ U(Wi ￿ tibi) + pi ￿ U(Wi ￿ ￿i ￿ tibi + bi) , (3)
where pi is the probability worker i will experience costly job loss, W is i￿ s
income regardless of whether he experiences a costly job loss,9 ti is the tax per
6Scheve and Slaughter (2004) note two reasons for focusing on the substitution e⁄ect; be-
cause it is direct (i.e., it places domestic workers in competition with foreign labor) and because
other researchers (primarily Rodrik, 1997) have emphasized in theory its possible role in gen-
erating insecurity.
7This is where the role of increasing automation a⁄ects labor-demand elasticities. Increases
in automation will reduce s, increasing the pass-through e⁄ect. Replacing workers with com-
puters will exacerbate the impact of trade on the labor-demand elasticity.
8Let z denote the marginal product of labor; let w and e denote the percent change in










z; and let z be a














V ar(z): For a graphic, see
Rodrik (1997, p. 16).
9W consists of wage (salary and bene￿ts) as well as non-wage income (wealth). This becomes
an important consideration in our empirical model speci￿cation, although not necessarily a
critical assumption.
4dollar that i incurs for the government to provide him with wage insurance, ￿i
is total amount of salary (and bene￿ts) lost if i loses his job and cannot ￿nd a
job with similar pay and bene￿ts, and bi is the amount the government will pay
him if he does experience a costly job loss. Assume the government works on a
balanced budget, such that expected pro￿ts (E￿) are
E￿ = tb ￿ pb = 0 (4)
) t = p ,
where there are no administrative costs and the taxes received equal the expected
bene￿ts paid out. Therefore, if the probability of costly job loss for worker i is
5% then t = 5 cents per dollar. Maximizing expected utility, where U =
p
C so
EUi = (1 ￿ pi)
p
(Wi ￿ pibi) + pi
p
(Wi ￿ ￿i ￿ pibi + bi) . (5)
Maximizing (5) with respect to bi gives us the optimal level of social insurance










(Wi ￿ ￿i ￿ pibi + bi)
= 0 (6)
) b￿
i = ￿i .
This is to say worker i is willing to pay taxes at a level where the government
assistance exactly o⁄sets his loss of income and bene￿ts if he experiences a costly
job loss. It follows that consumption is equalized where
Wi ￿ pi￿i . (7)
The problem of adverse selection occurs if we have two types of workers. One
is susceptible to o⁄shoring, with a probability pt of experiencing a costly job loss.
The second group of workers is safe from o⁄shoring and has a probability pn of
costly job loss where pn < pt. Providers of social insurance know the proportions
of the population that fall into each group but are unable to distinguish between
the two groups of workers. Therefore the government must charge a tax rate tn
on every worker; however tn < tt and the pro￿ts earned on the two groups of
workers are
E￿n = tnbn ￿ pnbn = 0; and (8)
E￿j = ttbt ￿ ptbt < 0 . (9)
Where the government breaks even on the group of workers safe from o⁄shoring,
and since pt > pn, the government operates at a loss overall and therefore private
social insurance would not be o⁄ered by the free market.
Using data from the Displaced Worker Survey from Kletzer (2007, Tables 7
and 9), we can estimate the optimal tax rates and the cost of a wage insurance
program for workers in tradable and nontradable industries. We calculate the
percent of workers who will experience a costly job loss (^ p) as follows:
^ p = ru + rs(1 ￿ u) , (10)
5where u is the percentage of workers that remain unemployed after job loss, r is
the job loss rate, and s is the share of workers that take a loss in earnings after
re-employment.
Table 1 shows that workers in tradable industries experience a greater decline
in income when faced with job loss compared with those workers in nontradable
industries. However, workers in tradable industries have slightly higher annual
incomes than their counterparts.10 From equation (7) we estimate the steady-
state levels of consumption and the optimal tax rates. The model predicts that
workers in tradable industries would be willing to pay 2.3 percent of their an-
nual income in taxes in return for wage insurance, while workers in nontradable
industries are willing to pay only 0.5 percent of their annual income in taxes.
These conditions set the total cost of a wage insurance program at $31 billion.
The pitfall of this approach is that the ^ p is the current proportion of workers
who experienced a costly job loss and not the probability of future job loss, which
raises the problem of adverse selection described above; the question noted by
CIR, is also raised: Are objective measures good proxies for expectations? We
address this issue in the following sections.
3 Data
Our data are from the General Social Survey conducted by the National Opin-
ion Research Center of the University of Chicago. The survey is administered
in February and March of each sample year, with the total number of respon-
dents ranging from 1,468 to 2,832. Since 1994, the GSS has been conducted on
a biannual basis. Respondents answer questions regarding their demographic
information and opinions on a plethora of topics, including two questions about
earnings and employment expectations, and a dozen questions about govern-
ment spending. We use the responses from the two employment questions to
measure perceived economic insecurity. So far as we are aware, this is the only
large survey dataset for the United States that contains such questions.
3.1 Variables to capture workers￿economic insecurity
The ￿rst question, which we label joblose, asks: ￿Thinking about the next 12
months, how likely do you think it is that you will lose your job or be laid o⁄￿
very likely, fairly likely, not too likely, or not at all likely?￿The second question,
which we label job￿nd, asks: ￿About how easy would it be for you to ￿nd a job
with another employer with approximately the same income and fringe bene￿ts
you now have? Would you say very easy, somewhat easy, or not easy at all?￿
Figures 1 and 2 plot the percentage of respondents who believe it is likely
and very likely they will lose there job (LIL) and believe it would be hard
to ￿nd a new job over the sample period (HDF). The ￿gures exhibit two
notable patterns. First, workers￿expectations about losing their job and ￿nding
10This result is in stark contrast with other social insurance models,(e.g., Moene and Waller-
stein, 2001) that assume 2 groups of workers: a high-income group with zero probability of
costly job loss and a low-income group with a high probability of costly job loss.
6a new job have moved fairly closely with the unemployment rate. This pattern
is consistent with CIR￿ s ￿nding that labor market indicators are good proxies
for perceived economic insecurity. Second, during the economic recovery of the
1990s and to a greater extent the recovery in the 2000s, workers were more
pessimistic about both job loss and ￿nding a job than they were during the
previous periods of relatively low unemployment in within the period of the
1970s and 1980s, this trend is highlighted by the growing divergence with the
unemployment rate. This divergence, beginning around 2000 (speci￿cally with
LIL), may be a re￿ ection of; the heightened concerns about the potential of
o⁄shoring of "white collar" service jobs or; the increased (and more negative)
attention the media has given to globalization (see Marks, Kalaitzandonakes,
and Sonduru, 2006).
We combine the answers of these two questions to de￿ne a variable that
measures whether workers believe they will su⁄er a pay cut or extended unem-
ployment as a result of job loss. Following Schmidt (1999), we de￿ne a binary
variable, costly job loss (CjL), as the fraction of respondents who said they were
very or fairly likely to lose their job in the next year and also said it would not
be easy at all to ￿nd another job with similar pay and bene￿ts. We assume
workers are indi⁄erent between two jobs with similar pay and bene￿ts, as both
jobs would provide the same level of economic security. Although summarizing
the survey￿ s information in such categorical variables is far from ideal, there are
few alternatives.
3.2 Variables to capture o⁄shoring
Theory indicates that tradable industries will exhibit more-elastic labor de-
mands, rasing labor-market volatility. According to the ￿ndings of Kletzer
(2007), this is exactly the case. Tradable industries have notably higher job-loss
rates than those safe from o⁄shoring; 0:126 compared with 0:058. Additionally,
workers in tradable industries saw income loss of $5,453 compared with $2,003
in nontradable industries (as noted in table 1). These ￿ndings support the the-
ory that workers in industries safe from o⁄shoring will express signi￿cantly lower
levels of economic insecurity. Following the results of Jensen and Kletzer (2005),
we construct our o⁄shoring variables.11
To develop an empirical approach identifying work activities that can be
potentially o⁄shored, Jensen and Kletzer assume activities traded domestically
can be potentially traded internationally, even if they currently are not. Using
spatial clustering, they group industries and occupations into ￿Gini classes,￿
where those industries and occupations with Gini coe¢ cients less than 0.1 are
classi￿ed as ￿Gini class 1￿or nontradable. We base our construction of our two
o⁄shoring variables on their results.12 The variable pIND identi￿es those in-
dustries in which activities can be o⁄shored. Industries such as personal services
11See Jensen and Kletzer (2005) for further discussion of the methodology used to identify
tradable industries and occupations.
12The GSS reports respondents￿Census industry and occupations codes, while Jensen and
Kletzer use NACIS and Major Standard Occupations Classi￿cation codes; therefore we use our
best judgment to apply their results.
7(e.g., teeth cleaning) are coded as zero, or nontradable. There is no reason a den-
tist or hygienist would worry about their job being o⁄shored. Other industries
in which the work could feasibly be o⁄shored are coded as 1.
Similar to our pIND variable, we use Jensen and Kletzer￿ s results to con-
struct a variable pOC, identifying those occupations safe from o⁄shoring (e.g.,
judges or physicians) and coding the variable as zero; those that can be po-
tentially o⁄shored are initially coded as 1. Certain occupational groups, such
as administrative assistants, ￿nd themselves in safe industries, but are in an
occupation that could be o⁄shored.
3.3 Measuring skill speci￿city
Between January 2000 and January 2006, over 3 million manufacturing jobs were
destroyed while some 8 million new jobs were created in the service sectors of
the economy. Transferable skills play an important role in workers￿transitions
from one industry to another. Some workers￿skills are industry-speci￿c, such as
machine operators, while other workers have skills that are easily transferable
across industries, such as management positions. Workers in occupations with
more transferable skills should be less vulnerable to industry-speci￿c shocks than
workers with industry-speci￿c skills. As it relates to our o⁄shoring variables,
workers with industry-speci￿c skills would expect to see their human capital
(and therefore wages) drop more after moving into a new sector than a worker
in an occupation with skills that are less industry-speci￿c (more transferable).
Bardhan and Tang (2006) suggest calculating an occupational dispersion mea-
sure to proxy industry-speci￿c skills. Occupations that are well diversi￿ed across
industries should exhibit lower levels of industry-speci￿c skills compared with
those occupations that are highly concentrated within one industry. They ￿nd
that an occupation spread out across many sectors is less volatile in terms of
wages and employment. We construct a normalized Her￿ndahl-Hirshman Index,















where si;j is the share of respondents in occupation i in industry j, n is the total
number of respondents, and HHIn
i ranges from 0 to 1.
Table 2 shows the average value of the HHIn
i based on 19 major occupational
groups for di⁄erent time periods over the entire sample. All of the occupations
tend to stay close to their 77-06 values, regardless of the time period. The last
column in the table shows the results of Bardhan and Tang (2006) for 1999 and
2005 using the much larger BLS Occupational Projections and Training Data,









13The authors thank John Tang for graciously sharing his results with us.
8The variable pOC￿ addresses the nonlinearity in measuring the impact of o⁄-
shoring by occupation. For example, a judge or a priest may be in a highly
concentrated occupation, but safe from o⁄shoring. Therefore we would expect a
respondent to express a high level of insecurity in the face of an industry-speci￿c
shock, such as o⁄shoring, only if his speci￿c job is prone to o⁄shoring and is in
highly concentrated occupation. Workers in safe occupations are coded as zero,
and those prone to o⁄shoring are measured by their level of transferable skills.
3.4 Individual ￿xed e⁄ects control variables
Demographic control variables are likely to account for some of the variation
among individuals￿perceptions about their economic security. However, immea-
surable and/or unobserved di⁄erences that are speci￿c to individuals may also
matter. When answering the GSS survey question about ￿nding a new job, one
respondent may believe he could ￿nd a new job paying 10 percent less with com-
parable bene￿ts and answer ￿somewhat easy,￿while another respondent may be
in the same situation and say ￿not easy at all.￿Unlike the U.K. panel survey
data used by Scheve and Slaughter (2004) and Campbell et al.(2007), the GSS
is a time series of cross-sections that does not track the same individual over
di⁄erent years. We are unable to control for individual-speci￿c e⁄ects using the
standard practice.14 However, we have auxiliary data from the GSS survey to
approximate the existing individual bias beyond our demographic controls.
Campbell et al. (2007) ￿nd that current expectations of unemployment
are associated with prior experiences of unemployment. Similary, the GSS asks
respondents a question about their past ￿nancial situation, speci￿cally: ￿During
the last few years, has your ￿nancial situation been getting better, worse, or has
it stayed the same?" We code the respondents￿answers to these questions with
values ranging from 1 to 3, where 3 equals getting better. Using this coding,
we construct the variable fSit . Including this variable in our models allows
us to approximate unobserved e⁄ects that in￿ uence the respondents￿answers
to the economic insecurity questions. More speci￿cally, fSit can be thought of
as a proxy for the past employment situation of the respondent. By de￿nition
we assume this variable is exogenous. Including this variable in our estimation
produces more precise estimates, but by no means accounts for all the unobserved
individual e⁄ects that are possible in a panel structure.
4 Empirical strategy
In section 4.1, we analyze the pooled time series cross-section GSS data us-
ing probit models, so as to examine the variation in economic insecurity at the
individual-respondent level. In section 4.2, we regress the estimated probabili-
ties of a worker expressing costly job loss on the demand for social insurance,
as to test the expected utility model results. Included in these regressions is
14Starting in 2008 the GSS will switch from a repeating cross-section design to a combined
repeating cross-section and panel-component design. When these new data become available
they will allow future research to test our approach of controlling for individual-speci￿c e⁄ects.
9a bias measure that ￿lters individuals sentiment toward government spending
independent of labor market concerns.
4.1 Determinates of economic insecurity
In cases where the variable to be estimated is limited to a range of values and
contains discrete responses, probit models are employed to provide the best
estimation. Generally speaking, we specify a probit model with the same form
as Aaronson and Sullivan (1998); Schmidt (1999). However there are a few
di⁄erences; both authors include a vector of industry variables while our model
includes the o⁄shoring variables, and in light of the recent work by Campbell et
al. (2007) we control for the respondents past ￿nancial situation.
Table 3 reports the coe¢ cients and standard errors from the speci￿cations
that use CjL as the dependent variable. The results are reported relative to
the base-case; white, male, age 25 to 39, who lived in the northeast in 1988
and worked in an industry and occupation safe from o⁄shoring. For robustness
purposes, the ￿rst four columns use di⁄erent model speci￿cations, which include
year and regional e⁄ects. The ￿fth column reports the base-case probability
and the marginal e⁄ects that correspond with the parameters estimated in our
"preferred" model 4. This model controls for the respondents￿past ￿nancial sit-
uation, fSit. The marginal e⁄ect corresponding to this variable indicates that a
base-case respondent who indicated his past ￿nancial situation has been getting
worse is 1.2 percent more likely to express fear of a costly job loss than a worker
who believes his ￿nancial situation has been getting better. This ￿nding is con-
sistent with Campbell et al. (2007), who ￿nd that (for the United Kingdom) an
additional 100 weeks of previous unemployment raises the probability of an em-
ployee feeling that future unemployment is ￿ likely" or "very likely" by 4 percent.
The coe¢ cient on the regional unemployment rate is consistently positive and
signi￿cant and indicates that a 1 percent increase in the regional unemployment
rate will increase workers￿perceived economic insecurity by 1.2 percent. This
also supports CIR￿ s conclusion that objective labor market indicators are good
estimates of workers perceptions, although they may be systematically biased
downward.
The variable that has the greatest impact on our insecurity measure is self-
employment. If the base-case respondent is self-employed, his probability of
expressing costly job loss increases from 5 percent to around 9 percent. If an
entrepreneur looses his job, in all likelihood he went out of business, so it is
understandable why self-employed workers will express a greater fear of job loss.
The parameter estimates of our o⁄shoring variables are quite robust across
all model speci￿cations. Our potential for o⁄shoring variables, pIND, pOC;
and pOC￿ are positive and signi￿cant across all model speci￿cations. Model 4
predicts that the probability that the base-case worker will express costly job
loss if he works in a tradable industry and occupation would be approximately
7 percent, or 2 percent higher than the base-case. This lends support to our
hypothesis that employees in industries and occupations safe from o⁄shoring
will express lower levels of job insecurity, and, moreover, that workers in highly
diversi￿ed occupations express less job insecurity.
104.2 Economic insecurity and the demand for social insurance
Using the base-case probabilities of costly job loss we can re-estimate the tax
rates outlined in table 1. The probit model results indicate that the probability
a worker in a tradable industry will express fear of costly job loss is 9.2 percent,
compared with 6.7 percent in nontradable industries in 2004. These correspond
to optimal tax rates of 2.45 percent and 0.88, respectively￿ which are slightly
higher than the optimal tax rates estimated using the actual proportions of the
population who experienced costly job loss. Suggesting that workers are, in
fact, more pessimistic about their prospects of future job loss and are willing to
pay higher tax rates than objective measures would indicate. On the aggregate,
the federal government would incur annual costs of about $30 billion. The vast
majority of the costs ($25.5 billion) are from providing wage insurance to workers
in tradable industries. These number seem reasonable when compared with
estimates by Bradford, Grieco, and Hufbauer (2006) that the lifetime loss by
workers displaced from o⁄shoring is about $50 billion per year.
While it may seem unreasonable to use the probability of a worker express-
ing fear of a costly job loss as the actual probability of costly job loss, we have
two justi￿cations for this claim. First, the number of workers that fear costly
job loss should be a good approximation of the actual probability a worker will
experience a costly job loss. Not all workers who fear costly job loss will ac-
tually lose their job; on the other hand, some workers will experience a costly
job loss without predicting it. Our estimates of costly job loss for 2002 (8.3
percent and 6.6 percent) compare reasonably well to the proportion of workers
who actually experienced costly job loss 2 years later.15 Moreover, Campbell
et al. (2007) ￿nd that expectations data are additionally informative and con-
tain useful private information for predicting future unemployment, above and
beyond observed objective variables. In light of a more desirable method of
estimating the probability of a worker experiencing costly job loss we are left
with using these estimated probabilities or the actual proportion of workers who
experienced a costly job loss from the DWS.
Unlike the data used by Mughan (2007), which encompasses only one year
and two policy questions,16 the GSS provides us with more questions that allow
us to determine whether a link from increased insecurity to greater demands
for social insurance truly exists. The GSS asks respondents if they believe the
government ought to reduce income di⁄erences between rich and poor by rais-
ing taxes of wealthy families or by giving income assistance to the poor. This
question is comparable to the question used by CIR. Additionally, the survey
ask respondents their opinions on the amount of government spending directed
toward education, social security, healthcare, and welfare programs. The mean
values indicate that, with the exception of welfare, respondents would like to see
15Ideally we would like to have the probabilities for 2003, as the survey questions ask re-
spondents "over the next 12 months." However the DWS and the GSS are reported in even
years.
16Mughan (2007) uses survey questions that ask respondents (1) "Is it the responsibility
of governments to take care of people who can￿ t take care of themselves?" and (2) "Do you
favor or oppose national health care insurance ￿nanced by tax money paying for most forms
of health care?"
11the federal government direct more money toward dealing with inequality and
providing more for education and social security and healthcare.
Model speci￿cation (1) in tables 4 through 8 presents the linear regression
results between the government spending variables and our estimated probabil-
ities of expressing costly job loss, ^ pi = prob(CjL = 1). Model speci￿cation (3)
includes the respondents wealth on the right-hand side.17 Unfortunately the
GSS asked respondents only to report their wealth in 2006; we therefore present
the results using only 2006 data. Where the entire sample was available, model
speci￿cations (1) and (2), the results are qualitatively similar.
As expected by the Rodrik (1997) hypothesis, workers with higher levels of
insecurity tend to believe the government should dedicate more resources toward
reducing inequality. Contrary to Mughan (2007): Higher levels of insecurity are
positively correlated with increased spending for welfare and healthcare. Quite
surprising, a higher probability of a respondent expressing costly job loss is
not correlated with an increase in that respondents support for more money
for education. In general, the results lend some support to our hypothesis;
however we cannot make any strong assumptions about this link because of the
unobserved bias, as we cannot control for individual ￿xed e⁄ects. High-income
individuals may be less likely to support government programs because they
believe the tax burden will fall on them. Or more insecure individuals tend to
have lower skills, and education and earn a lower wage and therefore are more
likely to support increased government spending. Conversely, individuals may
have an ideological bias where they consistently believe the government spends
too much or too little money. Mughan (2007) uses party a¢ liation as a proxy
for this bias; political party a¢ liation is obviously a function of labor market
considerations, among other things, raising an endogeneity problem.
In order to control for the inherent bias in respondents answers, we exploit the
data-rich GSS. In addition to questions about funding for social insurance type
programs, the GSS asks respondents their opinions about the level of spending to
do the following: protect the environment, help cities, reduce crime, reduce drug
addiction,provide foreign aid, improve roads, and maintain national parks.18 We
use these questions as instruments to measure the respondents￿inherent bias
for more or less government spending. None of these variables are correlated
with workers insecurity, and theoretically they should not be correlated with
employment outlook, but they are highly correlated with the social insurance
funding questions.19 We use these survey questions to calculate individual bias
17The variable w is the respondents wealth relative to their total income. Using total wealth
as opposed to a proportion does not have a signi￿cant impact on the coe¢ cient on ^ p:
18The selection criteria for these variables was exhaustive, ￿rst we collected all of the ques-
tions related to government funding and created a vector of control variables. Those variables
that were correlated with CjL were omitted, as well as any variables that may be a⁄ected by
changes in the labor market.
19One could make the case that poorer workers are more likely to be insecure about their
jobs and also more likely to be directly a⁄ected by drugs and crime, and therefore support
increased funding for these types of programs. This method of ￿ltering could over-estimate
the bias factor, but it is unlikely to be an underestimate.















where c is the vector of control questions. In model speci￿cations 2 and 4 we
include Bias on the right-hand side. In all of the models the coe¢ cient on
Bias has the expected positive sign and is signi￿cant at the 99 percent level.
The decline in the predictive power of p and w is insigni￿cant; there continues
to be a positive relationship between higher levels of insecurity and increased
funding for welfare and an increased role for the federal government in reducing
inequality. Taken together the results tend to substantiate the hypothesis that
workers with higher levels of insecurity demand more funding for social insurance
programs, particularly welfare and reducing inequality even after controlling for
individual bias. On other hand, our results do not indicate that insecure workers
want the government to dedicate more funding toward long-term solutions that
should naturally reduce inequality (and insecurity), such as more money for
education, but would prefer direct redistribution of income from the rich to the
poor.
5 Conclusion
The data support the hypothesis that increased competition from foreign labor￿
o⁄shoring, in particular￿ has played a signi￿cant role in generating worker in-
security. While this ￿nding is not necessarily new (for the U.K. see Scheve and
Slaughter, 2004), this paper is the ￿rst to use U.S. data to analyze this issue.
Secondly, Rodrik (1997) and Agell (1999) suggest that rising economic insecu-
rity has increased workers￿demand for social insurance. Mughan (2007) and
Cusack, Iversen, and Rehm (2006) are the only papers, to our knowledge, to
empirically test this hypothesis, and present mixed results. The GSS contains
characteristics similar to both studies, and our ￿ndings tend to refute those of
Mughan (2007) and corroborate the ￿ndings of CIR￿ that objective measures
of insecurity play a signi￿cant role in forming perceptions and higher levels of
insecurity (objective or perspective) cause workers to demand more social in-
surance. In the process, we substantiate the recent ￿nding of Campbell et al.
(2007) by showing that respondents￿past ￿nancial situation plays a signi￿cant
role in forming expectations of future job loss.
We have; used an expected utility model to show why higher levels of inse-
curity should lead to a greater demand for social insurance and; estimated the
costs of a wage insurance program. The model predicts that the cost of providing
wage insurance to all workers is around $30 billion. These costs are much higher
than the $16.7 million in wage insurance bene￿ts paid to workers in 2006 through
the U.S. Trade Adjustment Assistance program.20 This program has stringent
requirements that requires workers certify (on a layo⁄-by-layo⁄ approach) that
20According to the GAO (2007) only 6,313 workers recieved wage insurance bene￿ts in 2006.
13they have been adversely a⁄ected by international trade, requirements that dras-
tically increase overhead costs.21 The wage insurance bene￿t is only for workers
50 and older who ￿nd re-employment within 26 weeks after being laid o⁄from a
￿rm where a signi￿cant portion of the a⁄ected workers lacked easily transferable
skills. Our results suggest that workers with easily transferable skills will not
have a hard time ￿nding a job with similar pay and bene￿ts and therefore will
not demand wage insurance, making this requirement di¢ cult to test and unnec-
essary.22 From one perspective, providing wage insurance to all workers seems
like the best approach to increasing participation; workers in tradable industries
and occupations with high levels of industry-speci￿c skills will naturally consume
the majority of the bene￿ts. Moreover, a wage insurance program could be de-
sirable substitute for unemployment assistance because it reduces the duration
of unemployment. Reducing unemployment assistance (which had total outlays
of over $30 billion in 2006) or diverting resources from protectionist policies (the
annual maximum spending on farm subsidies is $23 billion) will pay for such a
program.
We have shown that, because of adverse selection, private markets are not
likely to accommodate the demand for wage insurance. Agell (1999) notes that
if governments are unwilling and/or unable to address these demands, workers
will seek protectionism as a method for relieving their insecurity. Recognizing
the rise in worker insecurity and addressing the increased demand for social
insurance is an important step toward preventing protectionism and preserving
future globalization. We leave it to future research to test whether workers that
express higher levels of insecurity actually prefer protectionism over free trade.
21According to the GAO (2007), a worker (or group) must ￿rst ￿le a petition with the
Department of Labor (DOL). Next, the DOL surveys the ￿rm undergoing the layo⁄ and its
customers and reviews industry data to determine if the worker (group) meets the criteria for
TAA.
22The GAO (2007) also recomends that these certi￿cation restrictions be eliminated to in-
crease enrollment. The report also notes that workers must forgo training and unemployment
insurance bene￿ts to qualify for wage insurance.
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16Figure 1: Percent of workers who believe they were likely to lose their job in the
next 12 months (95% con￿dence intervals)
Figure 2: Percent of workers who believe it would be hard to ￿nd a job with
similar pay or bene￿ts (95% con￿dence intervals)
17Table 1: Model Results
Variable tradable nontradable
^ p 0:086 0:036
W $20;459 $15;335
￿ = b $5;453 $2;003
W = W ￿ p￿ $19;989 $15;262
t 0:0229 0:0047
Employment (2004) 139;242;000
Employment Share 0:392 0:608
Total Cost $25.5 bil $6.1 bil
Source: authors￿calculations and Kletzer (2007, Tables 7 and 9),
employment data are from Bureau of Labor Statistics
Table 2: Industry diversi￿cation by occupational group
HHIn Bardhan and Tang
Years 77-86 87-96 97-06 77-06 99-05
Mean 0:294 0:287 0:338 0:290 0:386
Std Dev 0:321 0:302 0:342 0:313 0:319
N 5914 7872 8311 25374 123:98mil
Note: Bardhan and Tang data are for the entire labor force.
18Table 3: Regression Results: Costly Job Loss
Regressor Parameter Estimate Marginal E⁄ect









































































































































Year E⁄ects No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional E⁄ects No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Log Likihood ￿2430 ￿2405 ￿2405 ￿2329 ￿2329
N 13345 13345 13345 12686 12686
Notes: Each cell reports the maximum likelihood parameter estimate and, in parenthesis, its standard error.
Base case is a white male, married, age 25-24, living in New England in 1988 and is not self employed.
* Signi￿cant at the 95 percent level.
19Table 4: Regression Results: Inequality
Regressor Parameter Estimates






























R2 0:0190 0:0557 0:0298 0:0650
Note: All regression use 2006 data (N=575). Each cell reports the
parameter estimate and, in parenthesis, its standard error.
* Signi￿cant at the 99 percent level.
** Signi￿cant at the 95 percent level.
*** Signi￿cant at the 90 percent level.
Table 5: Regression Results: Welfare
Regressor Parameter Estimates






























R2 0:0084 0:0322 0:0117 0:0348
Note: See table 4 (N=570).
Table 6: Regression Results: Social Security
Regressor Parameter Estimates






























R2 0:0177 0:0461 0:0202 0:0480
Note: See table 4 (N=553).
20Table 7: Regression Results: Education
Regressor Parameter Estimates






























R2 0:0033 0:0691 0:0041 0:0694
Note: See table 4 (N=570).
Table 8: Regression Results: Healthcare
Regressor Parameter Estimates






























R2 0:0069 0:0673 0:0072 0:0348
Note: See table 4 (N=567).
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